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Making regulation responsive to commercial interests: 
streamlining drug industry watchdogs 
John Abraham 
Has the pharmaceutical industry skilfully managed to achieve an unhealthy influence over European 
drug regulatory agencies? 
New prescription drugs are developed and tested for 
quality, safety, and efficacy by the pharmaceutical 
industry, and little or no drug testing is conducted by 
governments in modern industrialised countries. Gov-
ernments have regulatory authorities which have a 
legal duty to protect public health by ensuring that 
new drugs are not licensed unless they are of adequate 
quality, safety, and efficacy (box 1). The thousands of 
birth deformities and deaths caused by thalidomide 
focused public and professional concerns on how the 
commercial interests of pharmaceutical companies 
may diverge from, or conflict with, the interests of 
patients and public health. The reasoning behind the 
creation of new government regulatory authorities in 
the post-thalidomide era was therefore that they 
should be “entirely independent” of the commercial 
interests of the pharmaceutical industry and should act 
on behalf of the public interest by checking the 
adequacy of the test data produced by the industry.1–3 
I explain how these government regulatory authorities 
in the European Union, which were initially 
established to provide independent scrutiny of 
pharmaceutical firms in the interests of public health, 
have become increasingly responsive to the 
commercial interests of the industry (box 2). 
Methods 
The arguments in this paper are derived from 
electronic searches of the medical and pharmaceutical 
literature, combined with interviews with industry, 
regulators, and other professionals in Europe. 
Summary points 
After the thalidomide disaster the public expected 
drug regulation would be independent of the 
interests of the pharmaceutical industry 
In the past 15 years the regulatory agencies have 
been overly influenced by the industry’s desire for 
rapid drug approvals 
Regulatory agencies have become heavily 
dependent on industry fees for their survival 
National agencies now find themselves competing 
with each other for industry fees for regulatory 
work 
European governments accepted these industry 
perspectives, although new drugs had in fact come to 
the UK or German markets in 1972-83, faster than in 
France, Italy, Sweden, or the United States, and more 
new drugs were first marketed in the United Kingdom 
or Germany in 1961-85 than in Austria, the Benelux 
countries, the eastern European countries, Italy, 
Scandinavia, Spain, Switzerland, or the United States 
(figs 1 and 2).6 Indeed, in 1988, the United Kingdom 
was found to have the fastest approval times for new 
drugs in the European Union.7 Moreover, in 1989, 
German regulatory staff argued that the speed of drug 
approvals was but a crude measure of efficiency, and 
that the drug review process was not delaying any 
 
Accusing the regulatory authorities 
of slowness and inefficiency 
The first stage in imputing slowness and inefficiency 
to regulatory authorities was to claim that new drugs 
were not being approved fast enough: this the 
Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry did 
during the 1980s. The industry claimed that delaying 
approvals was detrimental to the British economy 
because it resulted in drug development work going 
abroad.4 In Germany and Sweden the pharmaceutical 
industry also pressed for quicker drug approvals.5 
Box 1: Stages in drug development 
that regulatory agencies should check 
 Chemical and laboratory analysis 
 Non-clinical pharmacology and animal toxicology 
 Phase I trials with healthy human volunteers 
 Phase II clinical trials with small numbers of patients 
 Phase III clinical trials with more extensive 
patient numbers 
 Phase IV post-marketing pharmacovigilance 
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Box 2: Stages of increasing influence of the 
drugs industry on regulatory agencies 
 Credibility of regulatory agencies becomes 
undermined by suggestions that the need to take extra 
time to check data shows inefficiency 
 Regulatory agencies become increasingly dependent 
on funding from industry for development and running 
costs 
 The drugs industry is allowed a central role in 
setting the priorities for regulatory agencies—for 
example, rapid approval times for new drugs 
 Creation of an environment, such as the European 
Union’s mutual recognition procedure, in which 
regulatory agencies compete with each other for 
“regulatory business” 
genuine therapeutic advances because the backlog 
related only to products for which existing treatments 
were adequate.8–11 
Some Swedish regulators have argued that, even if 
some regulatory authorities were slower in approving 
drugs than others, this could be because they were 
under-resourced, rather than inefficient. In Britain, for 
example, from the late 1970s to 1986, staff levels in the 
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Fig 1 Relative lag periods for new drugs (new chemical entities) 
introduced in six countries, 1972-83 
Country of first introduction 
Fig 2 Numbers of new drugs (new chemical entities) by country of first 
introduction, 1961-85 
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regulatory authority grew by only 9% while licence 
applications increased by 87%. In the late 1980s, the 
American drug regulatory agency had six times as 
many staff handling drug applications as did its British 
counterpart.12 
Making regulatory institutions more 
responsive to industry 
European governments such as those of Germany, Swe-
den, and Britain decided to restructure their drug regu-
latory authorities in line with the industry’s demands. In 
the late 1980s, the industry proposed that it would fund 
drug approvals if this would result in a “more efficient 
service,” and called for greater informal consultation 
between companies and regulators.13–15 For example, in 
1989 the British government accepted the industry’s 
proposal that, to make regulation of medicines more 
“efficient,” the regulatory authority should in future 
recoup all its running costs from licensing fees, rather 
than 60% as before. A new regulatory authority funded 
by the pharmaceutical industry, the Medicines Control 
Agency, with its own director (who came from industry), 
replaced the existing authority.16 Health ministers also 
appointed a board of experts, drawn from various quar-
ters, including industry and the Department of Health, to 
advise them on the scope of the agency’s targets and its 
performance.17 A concern to protect the commercial 
interests of the industry was enshrined within the agen-
cy’s objectives. 
In 1990, Sweden established an independent regu-
latory authority unit, known as the Medical Products 
Agency, with increased dependence on industry fees, 
and also a special task force to reduce the backlog of 
new drug applications. In 1995, the German govern-
ment replaced the existing regulatory authority with 
the more industry-friendly federal institute for drugs 
and medical products,18 the staff of which were 
instructed to be less cautious about approving new 
drugs.19 Even the US drug regulatory agency became 
concerned about accelerating its new drug approvals 
relative to other regulatory authorities.20 
Europeanisation and interagency 
competition 
In addition, regulatory bodies have been placed in 
competition with each other for industry fees, and 
where there are institutional incentives, not to reject 
new drugs. This situation arose indirectly from the 
Europeanisation of pharmaceutical regulation, as a 
result of the European Commission’s adoption, to a 
large extent, of the industry’s vision for Europeanised 
drug regulation. The international pharmaceutical 
industry is interested in European harmonisation and 
streamlining of drug regulation because this allows a 
drug to be marketed in several states more or less 
simultaneously, taking advantage of “efficient” fast 
approval rates, rather than having to negotiate with 
separate national regulatory regimes. 
Since January 1998, new drugs can be licensed in 
more than one European Union country at once in one of 
two ways: mutual recognition or centralised procedure 
(box 3). To accommodate the industry’s desire for more 
rapid approval times, a strict timescale—210 days—has 
been prescribed by the Euro- 
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Box 3: Drug regulation in multiple EU member 
states 
One route, known as the mutual recognition 
procedure, enables manufacturers to seek 
simultaneous licensing for a new drug in two or more 
member states, providing that they have an existing 
licence for that drug in at least one, known as the 
reference member state. The regulatory agency of the 
reference state then approaches the agencies of the 
states in which approval is sought. Under this 
procedure, the regulators in the member states 
concerned are encouraged to agree to license the drug 
in their countries—that is, to mutually recognise the 
initial approval of the reference state. If they do not 
agree to do so the matter is referred to the European 
Commission’s scientific advisory body, the 
Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products, for 
arbitration. If the commission accepts the committee’s 
advice then it is binding on the states concerned and 
on the reference state. 
For biotechnology drug products, manufacturers 
must follow another route, known as the centralised 
procedure, which can also be used for highly 
innovative new drugs. In this procedure the advisory 
committee simply decides, after considering 
assessments by a rapporteur regulatory agency, 
whether the drug should be approved throughout the 
European Union. Any objections to the rapporteur’s 
assessment are considered by the committee, which 
then makes a binding recommendation for or against 
an European Union-wide licence. 
pean Commission for the mutual recognition procedure. 
Moreover, the largest amount of regulatory work (and 
hence the most fees from industry) comes from being 
the first state to which an application is submitted 
within the mutual recognition procedure, and being the 
rapporteur in the centralised procedure. As the 
regulatory agencies in the European Union are now 
largely funded by industry, and because companies look 
for fast approval rates as a key criterion when choosing 
where to submit the application for approval of a new 
drug, regulatory agencies are, in effect, competing with 
each other for “regulatory business” by attempting to 
approve drugs at an ever faster pace. 
The competition for fees from industry means that 
regulatory agencies are not satisfied to meet the Euro-
pean Commission’s requirement of approval or 
rejection within 210 days. For example, the British 
Medicines Control Agency’s average net in-house 
assessment time for new drugs fell from 154 working 
days in 1989 to 44 days by 1998 (fig 3).4 The drug 
regulatory review times for Germany, Sweden, other 
EU countries, and the United States have also fallen 
dramatically.4 20 It might be argued that this competition 
between agencies will enhance drug safety and 
efficacy, but even if competition were to encourage 
some regulatory agencies to try to improve their safety 
and efficacy regulation, this would be in a context of 
increasingly less time for all EU regulatory agencies to 
check drug safety and efficacy data. 
The suggestion that such interagency competition is 
driven by concern to improve safety and efficacy is 
further undermined by the fact that different approaches 
have been taken towards rejections of new drug 
applications and rejection of “old” unproved products at 
present on the market. The Swedish regulatory  
agency has extended the response period for a company 
whose product licence application faced rejection from six 
weeks to three months. Meanwhile, in Germany, “old” 
products, whose efficacy has never been demonstrated 
against the modern standards of the 1976 German drug 
law, were granted extended “licences of right” until 2004. 
Despite the potential disadvantages of these measures for 
the public, they were not regarded by the government 
authorities as “inefficient.”4 Evidently, the time taken for 
regulatory processes and decision making may be 
extended rather than accelerated if this is in the interests of 
the industry. 
Moreover, under the mutual recognition procedure, 
a heavy emphasis on widening the scope of new drug 
approvals coexists with institutional incentives not to 
block approval. If a member state does not wish to 
accord mutual recognition to the approval of a new 
drug by another member state on public health 
grounds, it must immediately inform the company, the 
reference member state, the other member states con-
cerned, and the Committee for Proprietary Medicinal 
Products, stating the reasons for its decision and 
indicating how the gaps it perceives in the new drug 
application might be filled so as to facilitate mutual 
recognition. A compulsory conciliation stage then fol-
lows to facilitate the member state’s recognition of the 
reference member state’s approval.4 Thus, regulators 
are under pressure to adopt quickly a position on the 
reference member state’s approval, and to assemble 
robust supporting evidence if they propose to reject an 
application on public health grounds. There is no such 
pressure if they intend to mutually recognise the refer-
ence member state’s approval. 
It might be argued that the acceleration of approval 
times for new drugs has been adopted so that patients 
can gain faster access to new treatments such as anti-
AIDS drugs. In Europe, evidence to support this 
hypothesis is at best scanty compared with the 
evidence that the rapid drug approval times have been 
a consequence of making regulatory agencies respon-
sive to the commercial interests of the pharmaceutical 
industry. Fast tracking of genuinely needed drugs can 
accommodate this demand from patients. Further-
more, if the acceleration of approval times for new 
drugs was genuinely driven by a desire to provide 
faster access to new treatments, a concomitant 
introduction of regulatory requirements for compara-
tive efficacy testing would be required to show that a 
new drug offers a real advance. Yet neither the 
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Fig 3 Decreasing approval times for new drugs at the UK Medicines 
Control Agency, 1989-2000 
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European Commission nor the governments of the 
European Union, North America, or Japan have intro-
duced such requirements, even though this would help 
bodies, such as the National Institute of Clinical Excel-
lence in Britain, to assess the cost effectiveness of 
drugs.21. 
Conclusion 
Over the past 20 years the independence of drug regu-
lation in Europe from the interests of the pharmaceu-
tical industry has been severely threatened. This is of 
major concern because doctors and patients need to be 
able to rely on the commitment of the regulatory 
system in their country to put the interests of public 
health above the commercial interests of industry. 
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Commentary: Concern over drug industry’s influence 
on regulatory policy in Europe 
Danielle Bardelay, Christophe Kopp 
Representatives of patient groups, health professional 
bodies, mutual insurance systems, and consumer 
organisations from some 10 countries of the European 
Union have grouped together under the umbrella 
organisation Medicines in Europe Forum to campaign 
against the deterioration of European drug regulation 
thatJohn Abraham so aptly describes.1 2 
Drug regulation has gradually moved away from its 
public health mission. National medicines agencies and 
the European agency are now serving first and 
foremost the pharmaceutical companies, who provide 
their main funds. So far, independent organisations of 
patients and health professionals in most European 
Union countries have either been almost ignored or 
patronised by regulators. 
In this context the current revision of the directive 
and regulation on human medicines is a source for 
concern. Overall, the drafts are in favour of drug com-
panies, and it is not surprising that the pharmaceutical 
industry has jumped at the revision, in the hope of 
making the legislation even more flexible and 
favourable to short term competitiveness. The fact that 
a trade oriented directorate of the European Commis-
sion, instead of the health directorate, is in charge of 
EU drug policy probably explains why public health 
interests are overlooked.3 
A healthy debate is under way in the EU parliament, 
fuelled by amendments coming from outside the 
industry. Some members of the European parliament 
(MEPs) have realised the threats. These include 
shortening of drug evaluation without regular and well 
conducted reassessment of risks and benefits; 
continuing secrecy of regulatory authorities, especially 
regarding pharmacovigilance4; priority given to  
industrial demands delaying generic development; and 
advertising direct to the consumer disguised as 
information. 
The Committee on the Environment, Public Health, 
and Consumer Policy of the EU parliament has 
requested a delay, and voting, initially due before the 
summer, has been postponed to this autumn. More than 
500 amendments were tabled, many of them favouring 
public health and patients’ interests. Members of the 
Medicines in Europe Forum met with MEPs. Thousands 
of petitions, many from readers of La Revue Prescrire, 
were sent to MEPs, and around 2500 have recently been 
addressed to the president of the EU parliament. German 
independent drug bulletins have jointly expressed 
concerns over the commission’s proposals. Members of 
the licensing committee (the Committee for Proprietary 
Medical Products) have voiced similar concerns to the 
president of the EU parliament.5 
The drafts have to undergo the complex co-decision 
process involving the European parliament and the 
Council of Europe. Health ministers of member states 
are in charge of the drafts—these are not, as was 
initially feared, solely in the hands of ministers of 
industry. The health ministers seem divided on the 
issue of procedures for authorising marketing, and on 
the respective roles of the European and national 
agencies, but they are aware of the detrimental effects 
of direct to consumer advertising. Some ministers are 
under public pressure to ensure the financial 
independence and accountability of their regulatory 
authorities. A number of proposals in the directive are, 
however, so controversial that the discussion will go 
on at least until mid-2003 or 2004. 
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One thing is clear: the public health needs of the 
European Union can no longer be neglected and the 
regulatory agencies cannot be left to operate largely for 
the benefit of the drug industry. Policy makers are now 
aware that the revision of the pharmaceutical legislation 
may have enormous consequences in terms of quality of 
drug evaluation and health expenditure.6 This is an 
encouraging result for those who strive to publicise 
such little known but socially sensitive issues. 
Competing interests: None declared. 
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Commentary: Much ado about a good thing 
J D Kleinke 
John Abraham’s argument that the European drug 
regulatory community has become aligned with the 
commercial interests of the pharmaceutical industry 
invites an obvious question: so what? 
During the period in which this alignment emerged 
and the regulatory process in the European Union 
became more efficient, the time required for the review 
of a drug’s efficacy data by the United Kingdom 
Medicines Control Agency decreased from154 work-
ing days in 1989 to 44 in 1998.1 Drug approval times in 
the United States fell during the same period, affecting 
the two most critical stages of drug development and 
evaluation. Between 1989 and 1998, the average time 
required to advance new chemical entities—which rep-
resent truly breakthrough rather than “me-too” drugs—
from the investigative stage to broader clinical 
evaluation fell from 76.0 to 70.3 months, and the sub-
sequent average time to full market approval fell from 
34.4 to 16.8 months. 
One of the clearly intended consequences of this 
growing “problem” is the rapid increase in the number 
of new chemical entities and other new drugs finding 
their way onto the market and into patients. During the 
period studied by Abraham, the mean number of new 
chemical entities approved by the US Food and Drug 
Administration, for either expanded clinical evaluation 
or market launch, increased from 18 to 37 per year. 
The mean number of all new drugs approved—new 
chemical entities plus “me-too” drugs—increased from 
63 in 1991 to 98 in 2000 (FDA data). 
Has this regulatory efficiency and its consequent 
gush of new drugs, sparked by the alignment of the 
approval process with commercial interests, put 
patients and the public health at risk? The data argue 
that it has not. During the 1990s, the total number of 
drugs withdrawn from the US market because of con-
cerns about patient safety remained constant, in the 
range of one to three a year. Between 1984 and 1988, 
long before the adoption of the regulatory reforms 
outlined in Abraham’s article, 3.5% of newly approved 
drugs were withdrawn from the US market because of 
concerns about safety; between 1994 and 1998, as the 
regulatory process changed in ways decried by 
Abraham, this number decreased to 1.2%.2 This 
decrease is good news for the public health that Abra-
ham’s paper purports to protect. 
Abraham argues that disproportionately less testing 
of older drugs “grandfathered” on to the market further 
betrays a regulatory process beholden to commercial 
interests. Again, an obvious response to this 
“regulatory lapse” should be a collective shrug. The 
best way to wean doctors off prescribing older, ineffec-
tive drugs is not through expensive proof—via scarce 
regulatory resources—of what is usually clinically 
obvious, but through even more rapid release of newer 
and better drugs. 
Finally, the mechanisms by which the European 
Union is achieving regulatory harmonisation are 
clearly creating “competition” among nations to 
become more efficient regulators of new drugs, a situa-
tion Abraham bemoans. The enlightened segments of 
the US healthcare community would welcome such a 
“problem.” 
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Endpiece 
Swearin’ 
Swearin’ belongs to some thrades—like printin’, 
bricklayin’ an’ plumbin’. It is no help at all, at all 
to tailors, shoemakers, hair-dressers, dintists, or 
authors. A surgeon needs it but a doctor niver. 
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Commentary: The freedom of informed choice 
Emma Bennion 
John Abraham argues that regulation of new drugs 
should be dictated less by the desires of the 
pharmaceutical industry and more by the needs of 
patients. I have Parkinson’s disease, and the drug I 
need has suffered at the hands of the regulators. 
In the United Kingdom one in seven people who 
are given a diagnosis of Parkinson’s disease is under 
40. I found it inconceivable that I should be one of 
them. In 1987, aged 37, I learned that to keep me 
mobile I would have to rely on drugs for the rest of my 
life. Silently and stealthily this insidious, progressive 
disease has taken over. Some days I blunder through 
my “off” periods in a fog, trying to finish whatever I 
had started a few moments previously. Tasmar 
(tolcapone), launched in Britain in 1997, relieves the 
“on /off” state in Parkinson’s disease and subsequently 
improves mobility and function.1 2 To those of us 
prepared to put up with monthly liver function tests, 
this drug was a lifesaver. Instantly, my “off” periods 
were dramatically reduced and the rigidity and brady-
kinesia, so typical of young onset Parkinson’s, 
disappeared. 
But Tasmar was withdrawn in Europe in 1998 after 
a few reports of severe hepatotoxicity. How does this 
compare, for example, with the number of strokes 
among women taking the contraceptive pill? Quality of 
life for me and many other people with Parkinson’s 
was shattered. There were days when I would just sit 
there, fighting back the tears, remembering how easy it 
used to be to walk across the room or pick up 
something that I had dropped, and feeling bitter at the 
European drug regulators. 
But a few of us who can afford to do so choose to 
obtain Tasmar privately, and import it on prescription 
from the United States, at a personal cost of 
approximately $700 (£450; €715) every three months. 
Most do not have this choice. 
Healthcare professionals and policy makers need to 
understand that their own perceptions of health may 
differ from those of their patients.3 Patients need to 
become empowered—to take control of their illness 
and so ensure that it does not impair their quality of 
life. Patients have knowledge and experience—and a 
desire to manage their own condition—and these three 
factors should be harnessed to ensure that resources are 
used wisely and services provided appropriately. 
Patients with long term conditions should have the 
right to make informed choices on issues such as 
whether or not to take part in drug trials, and on the 
pros and cons of a particular treatment and its adverse 
effects. I have exercised my right and have made an 
informed choice, even though drug regulation has left 
me with a barely tolerable financial burden. This is a 
price I am prepared to pay to remain mobile and out of 
residential care. 
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A memorable patient 
Straight from the patient’s mouth 
He was a 45 year old unemployed man living in a lower middle 
class joint family home in an urban area. He was referred for 
psychiatric evaluation by a private practitioner because he was 
depressed and irritable, he complained of sleep disturbance, and 
he described a constant clicking sound arising from the middle of 
his head. The last mentioned symptom evoked much interest, and 
I, the then junior resident in the unit, was instructed to present 
this unusual patient at the clinical psychiatry rounds. Patients 
with psychiatric problems do not always tell their story well, and 
clinicians often need to draw on their experience to find coherent 
strands in a narrative. Thus, my fellow residents understandably 
saw in this patient what they had been accustomed to in previous 
patients. The consensus was that he was phenomenologically 
experiencing elementary extracampine auditory hallucinations, 
and that his irritability and mood disturbance were perhaps 
epiphenomena of a paranoid illness, the symptoms of which I had 
failed to successfully elicit. I, however, had an ace up my sleeve. 
Unknown to my colleagues, during my exchange with the patient, 
I had asked, “Can other people hear the clicking that you hear 
inside your head?” “I suppose so,” he replied, a little doubtfully. 
“I’d need to open my mouth, and they’d need to put their ears 
really close up.” 
“Open your mouth,” I suggested. The patient opened wide, and I 
thrust my ear next to his mouth. Surprise—I, too, heard the clicking 
sound. 
The patient had palatal myoclonus. This was the reason for his 
poor sleeping; and his insomnia, and the disbelief that his symptom 
evoked in all and sundry, were doubtless responsible for his 
irritability and depression. 
Nearly 20 years have passed, but I have never forgotten the 
lesson: that I should always listen to my patients and test the 
goodness of fit of their beliefs before I try to fit them into my 
scheme of the universe. 
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